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LESSONS LEARNED: AVOIDING THE HARDSHIPS OF 
TRIBAL MINERAL LEASING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
OKLAHOMA TRIBAL WIND ENERGY 
Wyatt Swinford* 
I. Introduction & Abstract 
“Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” This old 
adage reflects the notion that a society’s intelligence is gauged by its ability 
to learn from the lessons of history and put them to good use.  
While the U.S. government’s historical treatment of Indian tribes and the 
restrictions placed on Indian tribal lands are fairly characterized as mistake 
after mistake, Congress has gradually relinquished its stranglehold on 
Indian lands. With the rapid development of renewable energy, Indian 
tribes have a new opportunity to take control of their own destiny by 
crafting the terms that bind and bring prosperity to their lands. Wind 
energy, in particular, holds great potential for the tribes. It is in this field 
that the tribes may exercise their growing freedom to develop their own 
energy production agreements. 
This article compares important oil and gas lease provisions to wind 
energy lease provisions, with the goal of illustrating the potential impact of 
including (and excluding) certain provisions from tribal wind energy leases. 
Although it is customary in the wind energy industry for the wind energy 
producers, or lessees, to draft and dominate negotiations of leases and 
agreements, this article strongly urges Indian tribes to play a more 
significant role in drafting these leases when they affect tribal lands; or, in 
the alternative, this article strongly urges Indian tribes to become more 
aggressive negotiators. Moreover, this article illustrates how tribes may 
draft wind lease provisions for use in Oklahoma.  
Part I provides the overall theme of this article. Part II establishes federal 
Indian policy as it relates to tribal land conveyances and wind energy 
agreements. Part III of this article highlights specific provisions of wind 
leases and illustrates their potential impact on the wind energy industry by 
comparing it to oil and gas leasing law. 
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There is an old aphorism that states: give a man a fish and he will eat for 
a day; teach a man to fish, and he will eat for a lifetime. While modern 
Congresses have attempted to encourage the latter,1 the application of tribal 
self-determination has not been so true to the sentiment. Perhaps modern 
Congresses heard a different version: teach a man to fish, but make sure 
you hold the fishing pole, bait the hook, and select the location. The modern 
federal statutory scheme serves as an obstacle to Indian tribal development 
of wind energy agreements that attempt to avoid the historic problems of 
tribal mineral development.  
The leasing of tribal lands is subject to a myriad of federal and, in the 
case of Public Law 280, state statutes.2 Thus, understanding the nature of 
tribal lands demands an understanding of federal and state leasing 
regulations alike, together with the history of tribal mineral leasing. 
A. History of Tribal Mineral Leasing 
Indian tribes’ inability to transfer fee title of real property has a long 
history in the United States. The European perspective was that, due to their 
aboriginal possession, Indian tribes inherently owned their lands in fee title 
as the original inhabitants.3 After European colonization, the tribes were 
forced to share ownership—specifically the alienability of those lands—
with the discovering European sovereign.4 European discovery and 
colonization of North America reverted the underlying fee title to the 
discovering sovereign, and the tribes merely retained a possessory right to 
use the lands.5 This was called the Doctrine of Discovery.6 Indian tribes 
                                                                                                             
 1. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
777, 779-81 (2006). 
 2. Tim Vollmann, Federal Approval of Mineral Development on Indian Lands, in 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
9-1 (Rocky Mountain Mineral L. Found., May 1999), 103C RMMLF-INST 9, pt. IV 
(Westlaw). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) (noting 
original Indian title was based on aboriginal possession). 
 4. Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 47-50 (1947). 
 5. Katharine F. Nelson, Resolving Native American Land Claims and the Eleventh 
Amendment: Changing the Balance of Power, 39 VILL. L. REV. 525, 530-31 (1994).  
 6. Id. 
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could not transfer fee title of real property to anyone other than the 
discovering sovereign without the consent of that sovereign.7 
The Doctrine of Discovery became clear by the twentieth century when 
the United States Supreme Court issued its first set of cases addressing 
Indian tribes’ alienability of real property.8 The Court primarily based its 
decisions on the statutory framework established by the First Congress, 
which restricted the sale of lands by Indian tribes unless specifically 
authorized by the United States.9 This statute became known as the Trade 
and Intercourse Act of 1790; after several amendments, it still governs 
conveyances of real property by the tribes today.10 
1. Trade and Intercourse Act 
The original purpose of the Trade and Intercourse Act was to prohibit all 
transactions with Indian tribes in an effort to keep unfair dealings from 
stirring up controversy among the tribes through the improvident 
disposition of tribal lands.11 This purpose embodies the sentiment of the 
Indian Trust Doctrine, which is a doctrine that imposes a fiduciary duty on 
the federal government to protect the tribes and their interests from 
exploitation by outsiders and, dogmatically, from themselves.12 Since its 
enactment, the Trade and Intercourse Act has been the primary source of 
law used to justify the federal government’s paternalistic control over 
Indian lands.13  
The current language of the Trade and Intercourse Act provides, in 
pertinent part: “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or 
                                                                                                             
 7. Cohen, supra note 4, at 47-49 (discussing the holding in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), that transfer of Indian title to private parties was not against the 
sovereign absent approval by the sovereign). 
 8. See generally id. at 47-58. 
 9. Act of 1790, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012) (regulating trade and intercourse with the 
Indian tribes); see also, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548 (1832); 
Proclamation of 1783, 25 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 602 (Sept. 22, 1783) (discussing 
limitations on dealings between whites and the tribes in place prior to the Non-Intercourse 
Act). 
 10. Vollmann, supra note 2, at pt. I. 
 11. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 118-19 (1960); 
see also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345-47 (1941) (noting the 
U.S. government’s interest in protecting aboriginal lands and the title thereto).  
 12. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The 
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1472, 1496. 
 13. Vollmann, supra note 2, at pt. I.  
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of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall 
be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or 
convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”14 The Trade and 
Intercourse Act remains binding law and, absent an exception created by 
Congress, it still applies to conveyances today.15 As such, any conveyance 
between a tribe and a non-tribal party requires the consent of the U.S. 
government.16 The Trade and Intercourse Act reflects the Indian Trust 
Doctrine, which is still pervasive in federal Indian policy and the 
government’s responsibility under that policy.17 
2. General Allotment Act of 1887 and the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 
The next restriction on the alienability of Indian lands came when 
Congress enacted the General Allotment Act of 1887 (GAA).18 In addition 
to opening some Indian lands to non-Indians,19 the GAA granted “each 
Indian” up to 160 acres.20 Congress allotted Indian lands to individual 
Indians but allotted lands were held in trust by the United States for a 
period of twenty-five years.21 Thereafter, the land was to become totally 
alienable and taxable fee interest in the hands of the Indian.22 
Because the GAA used broad language, it prevented any real property 
contracts during the trust period.23 While the passage of the twenty-five-
year period would have returned alienation rights to the Indian, 
administrative action often increased the trust period indefinitely.24 
Congress cemented the practice of leaving Indian alienability in 
                                                                                                             
 14. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012). 
 15. Thomas H. Shipps, The Non-Intercourse Act and Statutory Restrictions on Tribal 
Resource Development and Contracting, in NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 2-1 (Rocky Mountain Mineral L. Found., Nov. 2005), 2005 No. 5 RMMLF-INST 
Paper No. 2 (Westlaw).   
 16. See 25 U.S.C. § 177. 
 17. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. REV. 
777, 789-93 (2006). 
 18. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (2012)).  
 19. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1995).  
 20. General Allotment Act § 1, 24 Stat. at 388. 
 21. Id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389. 
 22. See County of Yakima v. Confed. Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 
U.S. 251, 263-64 (1992). 
 23. Vollmann, supra note 2, at pt. I.  
 24. Id. 
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administrative purgatory with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934 (IRA).25  
The IRA recognized the tribes as political entities within the American 
legal system.26 Although the IRA ended allotment, it continued to constrain 
the alienation of Indian trust lands.27 Under the IRA, alienation of restricted 
Indian lands required approval from the Secretary of the Interior.28 The 
IRA’s recognition of the tribes as political entities was sharply contradicted 
by the continuation of the alienation restrictions.29 The alienation 
restrictions limited tribal sovereignty over their own territory, and it 
foreshadowed Congress’ future revocation of recognition of tribal 
governments.30 
3. 1891 Leasing Act/Indian Appropriations Act of 1919 
The first express statutory authorization for Indian tribal lands to be 
leased occurred with the passage of the 1891 Leasing Act.31 The Act 
provided that leases for mining could be granted for ten years with other 
terms and conditions, including approval from the Secretary of the 
Interior.32 Although this act is not often cited as support for mineral leasing, 
the plain language of the statute provides: 
Where lands are occupied by Indians who have bought and paid 
for the same, and which lands are not needed for farming or 
agricultural purposes, and are not desired for individual 
allotments, the same may be leased by authority of the council 
speaking for such Indians, for a period not to exceed five years 
for grazing, or ten years for mining purposes in such quantities 
and upon such terms and conditions as the agent in charge of 
                                                                                                             
 25. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479). 
 26. See id. §§ 16–17, 48 Stat. at 978-88; see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the 
Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 667, 675 (2006). 
 27. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-462 (2012); see Dennis W. Arrow, Contemporary Tensions in 
Constitutional Indian Law, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 469, 498 n.150 (1987).  
 28. 25 U.S.C. § 464 (2012).  
 29. Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and the 
Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 320-21 (2009). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794.  
 32. Vollmann, supra note 2, at pt. II.A. 
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such reservation may recommend, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior.33 
The secretarial approval requirement continued with another express 
authorization for mining leases of allotted lands in the 1909 Indian 
Appropriations Act.34 The 1909 Act, however, does not apply to the Five 
Civilized Tribes or the Osage Indians in Oklahoma.35 In 1919, another 
Indian Appropriations Act specifically authorized the Secretary to approve 
twenty-year mining leases on unallotted lands in nine states.36 Although 
these various enactments provided for some leasing activity on tribal lands, 
none provided clear or uniform policy for all Indian tribes.  
4. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 
Congress finally developed a consistent and uniform leasing policy 
through the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA).37 While mirroring 
the amended IRA’s encouragement for tribal self-governance, the IMLA 
allowed the tribal council or spokesman of the freeholder Indian to make 
the initial authorization for mining leases.38 The IMLA leases can have a 
primary term of ten years and may continue so long as “minerals are 
produced in paying quantities.”39  
These leases were still subject to approval by the Secretary and had to be 
offered at a public auction under sealed bid, with proper notice as 
proscribed by the Secretary.40 The Secretary had the authority to reject the 
highest bid and repeat the advertisement for bids.41 With the agreement of 
the tribe, the Secretary might also authorize a private agreement for leasing 
the minerals.42 Despite the fact that the tribes played an increased role in 
determining their own leasing future under the IMLA, they were still 
restricted to ten-year leases with the possibility of extension into perpetuity; 
it took Congress forty-four years to eliminate this obstacle to tribal 
independence. 
                                                                                                             
 33. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (2012) (emphasis added).  
 34. Id. § 396. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Ch. 4, § 26, 41 Stat. 3, 31-34 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 399). 
 37. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (2012). 
 38. Id. § 396a. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. §§ 396a-396b. 
 41. See id. § 396b. 
 42. Id.  
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5. Indian Mineral Development Act 
Although the IMLA was the primary leasing authority for almost half a 
century, Congress found the restrictions on mineral leases incompatible 
with the newfound policy of tribal self-determination during the 1970s and 
1980s.43 In 1982, Congress passed the Indian Mineral Development Act 
(IMDA) in an effort to expand tribal leasing capabilities.44 The IMDA 
authorized tribes to enter into essentially any type of agreement, joint 
venture, or lease through private negotiation.45 These agreements were still 
subject to secretarial approval, but there was a specific limitation of 180 
days from submission of the agreement or within sixty days of compliance 
with 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) or any other federal law requirement for the 
Secretary to review and make a decision on the agreement.46   
These changes to federal Indian leasing policy created substantially more 
flexibility for tribes, as well as producers. They leave the actual terms of the 
agreement to the contracting parties, specifically the tribes.47 The only 
restriction on IMDA leases is a determination by the Secretary that the 
agreement be in the best interest of the tribe or Indian.48 The “best 
interests” of the tribe or Indian are determined, in part, by the potential 
economic return, the environmental, social, and cultural effects, and 
whether the agreement contained provisions governing dispute resolution.49 
The Secretary also considers a list of factors set forth in the C.F.R. in 
evaluating these agreements.50   
                                                                                                             
 43. Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal 
Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 583-84 (1994).  
 44. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2012); see H.R. REP. NO. 97-746 (1982).  
 45. 25 U.S.C § 2102(a). 
 46. Id. § 2103(a). 
 47. Michael E. Webster, Negotiating and Drafting Indian Mineral Development Act 
Agreements, in NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 2, at 6-1, 103C RMMLF-INST 6 (Westlaw).  
 48. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b). 
 49. Webster, supra note 47, at pt. III (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b)). 
 50. According to Michael Webster, the list of factors consists of the following: 
 (1) identification of the parties to the agreement and the lands and/or 
formations subject to the agreement, as well as the purpose of the agreement; 
 (2) the term (or duration) of the agreement; 
 (3) indemnification provisions protecting the Indian owner and the United 
States from third party claims arising from or related to the agreement; 
 (4) the respective obligations of the parties; 
 (5) the manner intended for disposal or sale of mineral resources produced 
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Although the IMDA strengthened the tribes’ independence in crafting 
their agreements, secretarial approval required compliance with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).51 While the IMDA 
left much to be desired in regard to complete tribal self-determination and 
Indian economic independence, NEPA created its own delays and increased 
expenses.52 Even so, the IMDA (and the IMLA) remained the primary 
authority for leasing tribal or Indian lands.53 
B. History Related to Wind Energy Leasing 
1. Energy Policy Act of 1992 
Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 199254 with the primary goal 
of deregulating generation and transmission of energy during a period of 
economic and energy crisis.55 Title XXVI of the Act was devoted to 
                                                                                                             
pursuant to the agreement; 
 (6) the payment obligations; 
 (7) the valuation methodology and accounting procedures to be utilized; 
 (8) operational and management procedures and responsibilities; 
 (9) assignment rights and limitations (if any); 
 (10) bonding obligations; 
 (11) insurance obligations; 
 (12) auditing procedures; 
 (13) dispute resolution procedures; 
 (14) force majeure provision; 
 (15) suspension or termination provisions and procedures; 
 (16) development timetable; 
 (17) abandonment, reclamation and restoration obligations and procedures; 
 (18) sharing of production and sales data; 
 (19) unitization and communitization rights and procedures; 
 (20) drainage and related takings protections; 
 (21) record keeping obligations and procedures. 
Webster, supra note 47, at pt. III (citing 25 C.F.R. § 225.21 (2014)). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012). 
 52. Shipps, supra note 15.  
 53. Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problem of the 
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 130-31 (2012). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11, 15, 16, 25, 26, 30, 42, 43, 48 U.S.C.). The portions of the Act related to Indian energy 
resources were codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (2012). 
 55. Arturo Gandara, United States-Mexico Electricity Transfers: Of Alien Electrons and 
the Migration of Undocumented Environmental Burdens, 16 ENERGY L.J. 1, 17 (1995).  
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supporting Indian energy resources.56 This title created a program within 
the Secretary of Energy’s office to assist tribes in reaching energy self-
sufficiency.57 As part of the program, the Secretary of Energy provided 
grants and low interest loans to tribes to promote the development of energy 
resources—specifically, renewable sources such as wind and solar energy.58 
The Act also created a commission to handle Indian energy issues and 
promote development, and provided training for tribes to handle and adhere 
to regulatory restrictions.59 
Prior to the Act, tribes commonly lacked control over the 
implementation of the new energy programs and the development of 
resources.60 The Secretary of Energy played the primary role in program 
implementation and resource development, restricting tribal input to 
consultation, and taking only recommendations from the newly formed 
committee.61 Although the Act expressed lofty goals for tribal 
independence in developing new sources of energy production, Congress’ 
ideals of tribal control of energy development—regardless of sincerity—
were not accomplished.62 With the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, however, Congress revisited the subject by amending the statute and 
moved closer to tribal independence over energy resource development on 
tribal lands.63 
2. Energy Policy Act of 2005  
Congress took action to encourage and promote the development of 
renewable energy resources with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 (2005 Act).64 Portions of the 2005 Act placed requirements on the 
                                                                                                             
 56. Tracey A LeBeau, Reclaiming Reservation Infrastructure: Regulatory and 
Economic Opportunities for Tribal Development, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 245 
(2001).  
 57. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 2603, 106 Stat. at 3114. 
 58. Id. § 2603(a)(1)-(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 3114. 
 59. Id. § 2604(c), 106 Stat. at 3114. 
 60. Benjamin J. Fosland, A Case of Not-So-Fatal Flaws: Re-Evaluating the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 447, 448 (2012). 
 61. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, §§ 2602, 2605(k), 106 Stat. at 3113, 3115-18. 
 62. See Fosland, supra note 60, at 448.  
 63. Id. at 452-53. 
 64. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506); see Kevin 
L. Shaw & Richard D. Deutsch, Wind Power and Other Renewable Energy Projects: The 
New Wave of Power Project Development on Indian Lands, in NATURAL RESOURCES 
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federal government to increase its use of renewable energy, specifically 
targeting wind energy.65 Section 502 of the 2005 Act was devoted to Indian 
energy and amended Title XXVI of the 1992 Act.66 
Among other important changes to Title XXVI, the 2005 Act gave tribes 
nearly complete freedom to enter into any type of energy resource 
development lease or agreement.67 Tribes were no longer required to seek 
secretarial approval of individual leases or agreements, provided that the 
tribe had a Tribal Energy Resource Agreement (TERA) in place with the 
Secretary.68 The 2005 Act also specifically gave tribes authority over 
agreements or leases for the production of electricity.69 The 2005 Act, 
however, placed a limit of thirty years for non-mineral agreements and 
leases.70 
Although the leases and agreements under the 2005 Act might be free 
from secretarial approval, securing a TERA was not a streamlined process. 
In addition to numerous requirements, the Secretary must be satisfied that 
the tribe had “sufficient capacity to regulate the development of energy 
resources.”71 TERAs had to include provisions to ensure compliance with 
environmental review processes, and were subject to periodic annual review 
by the Secretary, which could result in the suspension of the TERA if the 
tribe did not take action to address Secretarial concerns.72 Moreover, 
TERAs were subject to public comment and review.73 
The flexibility of leasing and agreement options under the 2005 Act was 
an optimistic approach to relinquishing some oversight over tribal lands. As 
of April 30, 2014, however, not a single Indian tribe has formally applied 
for a TERA.74 The red tape surrounding the application process and 
                                                                                                             
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 15, at 9-1, 2005 No. 5 RMMLF-INST Paper 
No. 9 (Westlaw).  
 65. 2005 Act § 203(a)-(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 652 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15852). 
 66. Id. § 502(a), 119 Stat. at 763-64 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7144e). 
 67. See 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (2012). 
 68. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)-(D). 
 69. Id. § 3504(a)(1)(B). 
 70. Id. § 3504(a)(2)(B). 
 71. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(i). 
 72. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C)-(E), (e)(4). 
 73. Id. § 3504(e)(3). 
 74. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 
2014: Hearing on S. 2132 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) 
(testimony of Kevin Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dept. of Interior) 
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subsequent constraints imposed by TERAs is partly responsible for the 
failure of the 2005 Act.75 Congress introduced Senate Bill 2132 during the 
113th Congress, but it has yet to be passed. Without the necessary reform to 
the 2005 Act, it is unlikely any tribes will take advantage of the potential 
flexibility under a TERA.  
3. Indian Long-Term Leasing Act 
Congress passed the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act (ILTLA)76 in 1955 
to allow Indian owners of restricted Indian lands to lease their lands. The 
ILTLA allowed an Indian or tribe to lease restricted land for any “business 
purpose.”77 The ILTLA provides, in pertinent part: 
Any restricted Indian lands, whether tribally, or individually 
owned, may be leased by the Indian owners, with the approval of 
the Secretary of the Interior, for public, religious, educational, 
recreational, residential, or business purposes, including the 
development or utilization of natural resources in connection 
with operations under such leases, for grazing purposes, and for 
those farming purposes which require the making of a substantial 
investment in the improvement of the land for the production of 
specialized crops as determined by said Secretary.78 
ILTLA leases typically had a duration term of twenty-five years, except for 
the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, among others, which had a term of 
ninety-nine years.79 The standard twenty-five-year term might be extended 
for an additional twenty-five years.80 Leases under the ILTLA were subject 
to approval by the Secretary.81 The Secretary had to find that adequate 
consideration was given for the lease.82 The Secretary also had sole 
discretion to cancel any ILTLA lease that might have caused the United 
States to violate the trust obligation to that Indian or tribe.83 
                                                                                                             
[hereinafter Testimony of Washburn], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg88821/ 
html/CHRG-113shrg88821.htm. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-255, 69 Stat. 539 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 415).  
 77. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. § 415(h)(7). 
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Tribes have used ILTLA leases for a variety of energy related projects, 
including oil and gas production, gathering facilities, and advertising 
placement.84 As such, the opportunity for entrepreneurial creativity to 
conflict with bureaucratic processes was high. The Department of the 
Interior issued extensive regulations that governed wind leasing, based in 
part on the restrictions of Section 415.85 Regulations on wind energy 
indicate that secretarial review of a lease term only applied to individual 
Indians and not the tribes.86 Furthermore, the regulatory requirements 
prohibited unlawful conduct outside of the lessor’s control, if certain 
historical or social connections were present at the leased premises.87 As 
illustrated by the ILTLA and the consistent and unfortunate prerogative of 
Congress, tribal independence over management and leasing of tribal lands 
only comes with sufferance of governmental oversight.  
4. Section 81, Secretarial Approval of Contracts 
Section 81 was another overreaching layer of federal regulation of Indian 
lands directed specifically at contracts encumbering Indian lands.88 Section 
81 provided, in pertinent part: “No agreement or contract with an Indian 
tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period of [seven] or more years shall 
be valid unless that agreement or contract bears the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior or a designee of the Secretary.”89 Subject to the 
Secretary’s determination, the approval restriction of Section 81 did not 
apply to encumbrances not covered by other authority.90 As such mineral 
leases and other surface leases were not within the scope of Section 81.91  
Section 81 also likely applies to renewable energy projects that take the 
form of an easement.92 While leases may be the more common property 
right used to support wind energy projects, easements can also serve as a 
capable vehicle for wind project development.93 Under Department of the 
Interior regulation and applicable case law, easements encumber Indian 
                                                                                                             
 84. Royster, supra note 53, at 103-04. 
 85. See 25 C.F.R. § 162.501(a)(2) (2015).   
 86. Id. § 162.540(b). 
 87. Id. § 162.542(c). 
 88. See 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2012). 
 89. Id. § 81(b). 
 90. See id. § 81(c); Royster, supra note 53, at 104. 
 91. Royster, supra note 53, at 104. 
 92. Id. at 104-05. 
 93. Id. at 105. 
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land for the purposes of Section 81 because an easement transfers a legal 
interest in the land.94 Even exploratory agreements, such as a license to 
place meteorological towers (MET towers), may likely fall under the 
definition of an encumbrance of Indian land. The license may convey an 
enforceable interest in the property.   
The applicability of Section 81 creates a significant issue as wind energy 
agreements necessitate terms longer than seven years, and thus, secretarial 
approval is required.95 Similar to ILTLA, Section 81 contracts also require 
specific provisions, which can constrain a tribe’s ability to independently 
develop the terms of their contracts.96 As seen with the multiple leasing 
authorities, Section 81 might also stymie tribal wind energy development 
because of secretarial approval requirement and agreement restrictions. 
III. Pitfalls to Avoid in Wind Leasing 
The development of a wind energy project is primarily accomplished 
through long-term leases; however, the application of oil and gas leasing 
principles to wind energy production has created new issues, largely 
associated with and analogous to the competition between the surface and 
mineral estates of real property.97 Confusion surrounding who owns the 
rights to wind production and how those rights are balanced against one 
another is the impetus for precautionary drafting of leases and 
agreements.98 These questions regarding wind rights largely remain 
unanswered, and thus, present opportunities for future litigation, absent 
careful lease drafting.99 
Given the numerous restrictions on the alienation of Indian land, 
contracting around potential new issues in wind leasing can be a precarious 
undertaking. While the constant scrutiny of secretarial review is a sufficient 
constraint in itself, statutory and regulatory proscriptions as to specific 
provisions of Indian leases may prevent a tribe from developing an 
agreement designed to avoid conflict. The following section highlights (1) 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id.; see 25 C.F.R. § 84.002 (2015); GasPlus, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 510 F. 
Supp. 2d 18, 29 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 95. Royster, supra note 53, at 106.  
 96. See 25 U.S.C. § 81(d)(2). 
 97. See Lisa Chavarria, Wind Power: Prospective Issues, 68 TEX. B.J. 832, 835 (2005). 
 98. Alan J. Alexander, The Texas Wind Estate: Wind as a Natural Resource and 
Severable Property Interest, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429, 462 (2011). 
 99. Brit T. Brown & Benjamin A. Escobar, Wind Power: Generating Electricity and 
Lawsuits, 28 ENERGY L.J. 489, 513 (2007). 
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specific goals and provisions of wind leases, (2) comparable common law 
problems from oil and gas leasing, and (3) how tribes can develop their own 
provisions in leases to avoid similar problems.  
A. Purpose of the Lease 
The essential purpose of an energy resource lease is to allow the lessee to 
explore and produce discovered resources.100 Historically, energy 
production leases base compensation on a percentage, or royalty, of actual 
production.101 Production predominately guides the concerns and wants of 
both parties. Specifically, the lessor is concerned about the amount of 
compensation they will receive for the use of their land. If the lessor’s 
restrictions upon the lessee do not allow the lessee to economically produce 
the available energy resources, then the lessor’s compensation will go down 
or the lessee will not take the lease at all. In such a case, the lessor’s other 
concerns suffocate the lease’s ability to accomplish its purpose.  
Likewise, if Indian wind leases remain so restrictive as to prevent 
economical production of electricity, then the tribe may never achieve its 
pecuniary interests in its wind resources. This is not to say that tribes should 
avoid tailoring their own agreements to avoid potential problems. On the 
contrary, tribes should just be aware of overburdening the leasehold estate 
with restrictions because Indian leases are already subject to numerous 
restrictions from federal law. 
B. Features of the Lease 
The most developed type of energy lease is the mineral lease.102 The 
mineral lease, specifically the oil and gas lease, has evolved over a period 
of nearly two centuries.103 Each evolution of the oil and gas lease has been 
in response to issues caused by production or operations.104 Thus, the 
evolution of the oil and gas lease and its provisions make it a functional 
comparison for tribal wind leases. 
An oil and gas lease is essentially composed of four basic provisions: (1) 
the granting clause, (2) the habendum clause, (3) the drilling/delay rental 
                                                                                                             
 100. See, e.g., Boatman v. Andre, 12 P.2d 370, 376 (Wyo. 1932). 
 101. See EUGENE KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 1.32 (Anderson Publishing Co. ed., 
1987) (reciting the first known oil and gas lease from 1853, which provided the lessor with a 
percentage of the proceeds from the oil produced). 
 102. See id. § 18.1. 
 103. See id. §§ 1.32, 18.1.  
 104. Id. § 18.1. 
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clause, and (4) a royalty clause,105 With additional clauses crafted to alter 
the rights in these four basic provisions.106 The granting clause provides the 
nature of the interest being granting.107 The habendum clause describes the 
duration of the interest being granted.108 The drilling clause, while tied to 
the function of the habendum clause, prescribes the rights and privileges of 
the lessor and lessee during the primary term of the lease.109 Royalty 
provisions specify the marginal compensation to be provided to the lessor 
for the lessee’s extraction of mineral resources.110 
To understand the individual parts of an oil and gas lease, it is important 
to understand the rights flowing from the mineral estate. As explained by 
the Supreme Court of Texas, the mineral estate essentially contains five 
rights: (1) development, (2) authority to lease, (3) receipt of bonus 
payments, (4) receipt of delay rentals, and (5) receipt of royalty. 111 
Development rights are the rights of ingress and egress.112 The right to lease 
is the authority to confer the development rights upon another.113 The rights 
to receive bonus, delay rentals, and royalty payments are a trifurcation of 
the right of the lessor to realize the economic benefits of the mineral 
estate.114 The distinct characteristics of these rights are largely a 
development from the ability of the mineral estate to be severed from fee 
title.115 
The wind estate carries similar rights of severability as the mineral 
estate.116 In Wyoming and Montana, for example, the respective legislatures 
have declared the wind estate to contain its own recognizable property 
rights.117 In these states, wind leases contain provisions similar to oil and 
gas leases because wind estates possess the same property rights as mineral 
                                                                                                             
 105. David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 447 (1987). 
 106. Id. at 447-48. 
 107. KUNTZ, supra note 101, § 23.1[a]. 
 108. Id. § 26.1. 
 109. Id. § 27.1. 
 110. Id. § 38.1[a].  
 111. Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (1986); see KUNTZ, supra note 101, § 15.2.  
 112. Altman, 712 S.W.2d at 118.  
 113. KUNTZ, supra note 101, § 15.2. 
 114. See id.  
 115. See Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 278 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (recognizing the severable mineral estate necessarily carries distinct property 
rights).  
 116. Id.  
 117. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-27-103 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-402(4) (2015). 
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estates. 118 But variation is great among wind leases because of the infancy 
of wind estate law.119 Because wind leases have yet to take any standard 
form, they often contain provisions that differ significantly from lease to 
lease.120 
Wind lease provision variety creates a special problem for tribes in 
developing their agreements. Tribes must be cognizant of federal 
restrictions in the 2005 Act, ILTLA, and Section 81. Fortunately, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has attempted to clarify federal restriction 
by providing a specific guide to permissible wind leases and agreements. 121 
Using the BIA regulations as a guideline, tribes can discern the limits on 
creative drafting. 
1. Granting Clause  
By delving deeper into the nature of the interests granted by oil and gas 
leases, the specifics of what a wind lease may grant and the type of transfer 
a tribe may make become more clear. Different jurisdictions classify and 
describe interests in various ways.122 Depending on the ownership theory 
used by a given jurisdiction, be it ownership-in-place or the rule of capture, 
an oil and gas lease may grant a fee simple determinable or a profit a 
prendre.123 Regardless of the jurisdiction’s description of the granted 
mineral leasehold interest, the broad language of the Trade and Intercourse 
Act (and subsequent acts) concerning all conveyances of real property 
trigger the Indian Trust Doctrine, along with the required Secretary 
approval.124 
Although the wind estate has not been defined in all jurisdictions, most 
wind leases appear to convey an interest in property as some form of 
tenancy for years.125 It seems clear that wind leases which “lease and let” 
tribal lands constitute a lease under the Trade and Intercourse Act and its 
                                                                                                             
 118. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-405 with KUNTZ, supra note 101, § 22.2. 
 119. See Ernest E. Smith, Renewable Energy – The Increasing Role of Wind Power: 
Incentives, Mandates, Siting, and Leasing, 26 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 43, 62-63 (2005) 
(from section 2.04, “Elements of the Wind Lease”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See 25 C.F.R. § 162.501 (2013). 
 122. KUNTZ, supra note 101, § 23.2.  
 123. Id.  
 124. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012); see also 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) 
(2012). 
 125. See Brown & Escobar, supra note 99, at 513. 
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progeny.126 Wind energy agreements generally contain provisions that 
allow the producer to test wind flow, construct turbines, and produce 
electricity. 127 These provisions essentially function as some form of option, 
easement, or lease,128 and therein, while not specifically denoted as a lease 
or conveyance, they function as a transfer of a portion of title to property 
and will be subject to federal government approval.129 Thus, the granting 
clause triggers the Indian Trust Doctrine and brings the lease under 
secretarial review.130 
As to the actual uses granted, the oil and gas lease generally grants to the 
lessee the right to use as much of the surface as is “[r]easonably necessary 
to explore, develop, and transport the minerals.”131 This use is not an 
exclusive possessory right and the lessor’s interest in the mineral estate 
typically sets the geographic bounds.132 The vertical bounds, or the depth to 
which an oil and gas lessee is bound, is not restricted, unless the mineral 
estate has been severed by depth, and the lessor owns severed portions of 
the mineral estate.133 
In addition to the spatial uses granted by the oil and gas lease, the lease 
necessarily grants the right to the lessee to recover certain hydrocarbons.134 
This right includes the right of the lessee to drill or undertake operations to 
recover certain resources and, in most cases, prescribes the time in which 
action must be taken.135 Some leases do not confer the ability to recover all 
substances from the mineral estate.136 Case law generally permits the 
recovery of oil and different types of gas produced incidentally, but not 
substances such as coal, gypsum, limestone, rock, and gravel.137 Whether a 
                                                                                                             
 126. See 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also 25 U.S.C. § 396a; 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
 127. Shannon L. Ferrell & Rusty Rumley, Understanding Wind Power Agreements, in 
WIND ENERGY LEASING HANDBOOK 39, 40 (Okla. Coop. Extension Serv., Okla. State Univ. 
2013). 
 128. Id. at 39. 
 129. See 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also 25 U.S.C. § 396a; 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
 130. See 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also 25 U.S.C. § 396a; 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
 131. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979). 
 132. KUNTZ, supra note 101, § 23.2. 
 133. See generally Allen D. Cummings, Rights, Obligations, and Problems of Depth-
Severed Mineral and Leasehold Ownership, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 26-1, 26-4 to 26-
6 (2003) (section 26.02[1][b-c]).  
 134. KUNTZ, supra note 101, § 24.1. 
 135. See id. § 27.1. 
 136. Id. § 24.1. 
 137. Id. 
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substance is recoverable depends on whether the parties contemplated that 
type of substance being recovered in the instant lease.138 
Likewise, wind leases must grant producers the ability to enter the 
surface and undertake all reasonably necessary operations to produce the 
wind resource.139 As illustrated in oil and gas leasing history, the wind lease 
likely carries the limitations of only using as much of the surface as actually 
is needed to produce the wind resource.140 The absence of established case 
law interpreting the reasonable use of wind leases requires the inclusion of 
specific provisions that clearly demarcate those reasonable uses.141 
Tribes must compare the specific provisions of the granting clause in 
wind leases with the provisions required by the BIA.142 It is important to 
note that wind developers typically need to assess the viability of wind 
flow143 over a given parcel of land for a period of at least one to two years 
before a wind project can begin.144 Therefore, wind lease drafters must 
view the lease as granting two distinct rights: the right to test and the right 
to produce. Regardless of whether these rights are granted in a single lease 
that provides an option for the right to produce, or in successive 
agreements, tribes must be cognizant of the federal requirements for each 
right. 
The BIA requires two separate leases for the right to test and the right to 
produce: (1) the Wind Energy Evaluation Lease (WEEL), and (2) the Wind 
and Solar Resource Lease (WSR), respectively.145 Specifically, an Indian 
tribe drafting a WSR must identify: 
 (1) The tract or parcel of land being leased; 
 (2) The purpose of the lease and authorized uses of the leased 
premises; 
                                                                                                             
 138. Id. § 24.1; see also Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass’n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698, 702 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929). 
 139. Alexander, supra note 98. 
 140. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979). 
 141. See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, Lindsay Grisamer & E. Nichole Saunders, Formulating 
A Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 
892 (2011); Chavarria, supra note 97, at 833.  
 142. See 25 C.F.R. § 162.542 (2015) (listing the various requirements of a lease 
regarding purpose and uses granted). 
 143. See Ferrell & Rumley, supra note 127, at 40 (discussing how wind flow is analyzed 
with meteorological towers (“MET Towers”)).  
 144. See id. 
 145. See 25 C.F.R. § 162.501(a) (2015).  
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 (3) The parties to the lease; 
 (4) The term of the lease; 
 (5) The ownership of permanent improvements and the 
responsibility for constructing, operating, maintaining, and 
managing, WSR equipment, roads, transmission lines and related 
facilities under § 162.543; 
 (6) Who is responsible for evaluating the leased premises for 
suitability; purchasing, installing, operating, and maintaining 
WSR equipment; negotiating power purchase agreements; and 
transmission; 
 (7) Payment requirements and late payment charges, 
including interest; 
 (8) Due diligence requirements, under § 162.546; 
 (9) Insurance requirements, under § 162.562; and 
 (10) Bonding requirements under § 162.559. If a performance 
bond is required, the lease must state that the lessee must obtain 
the consent of the surety for any legal instrument that directly 
affects their obligations and liabilities.146 
A WEEL has virtually the same provision requirements as a WSR;147 
however, because of the lack of guidance on WEELs and WSRs, tribes 
must draft in extensive detail. For example, tribes should include provisions 
addressing access, construction, transmission, non-obstruction, overhang, 
and noise.148 Access provisions should describe the producer’s right to enter 
the surface, build roads, and construct, operate, and maintain production or 
testing equipment.149 Moreover, it is often overlooked that before actual 
erection, wind projects require “lay down” areas for the equipment.150 It is 
also important that tribes include provisions governing actual placement of 
the turbine.151 Provisions must address the placement of transmission lines 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. § 162.542. 
 147. Compare id. § 162.513 with id. § 162.542. 
 148. Ferrell & Rumley, supra note 127, at 40.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 44-45. 
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and substations.152 Because unobstructed airflow is essential to wind energy 
production, tribes should ensure that the tribe’s activity does not obstruct 
airflow.153 Noise and overhang provisions will almost certainly be a 
concern of the producer and they should likewise be addressed by the tribe.  
The provisions discussed above outline the basic relationship between a 
tribe and a wind energy producer, but this outline does not contemplate 
potential conflicts between estates. Although tribes may “own” fee title to a 
potential wind energy project site, the possessory rights of the mineral or 
surface estate may lie with non-tribal parties. This creates the potential for 
conflict between the estates and should be contemplated by a wind lease. 
a) Conflicts Between the Estates  
As discussed above, the wind estate must carry the right of reasonable 
use of the surface so far as it is necessary to produce wind resources. While 
the use of the surface may be reasonable within the interest of the wind 
estate, such use may be unreasonable from the perspective of the mineral or 
surface estate. For instance, even in jurisdictions where the wind estate is 
not severable from the surface estate, prior easements and surface leases, 
such as a grazing lease, may interfere with the production of the wind 
estate.  
Oil and gas production necessarily determines whether the surface or 
mineral estate is dominant.154 As such, the mineral estate must have 
reasonable use of the surface and the surface estate must yield to that use, 
generally even over the objection of the surface estate owner.155 But, where 
the mineral estate’s use is neither reasonable nor necessary, the mineral 
estate must yield to the surface estate’s prior use and pursue a viable 
alternative for recovery of the minerals.156 Courts typically call this the 
Accommodation Doctrine.157 A wind estate’s competition for dominance 
over the mineral estate does not necessarily depend on whether the 
jurisdiction recognizes the wind estate as a severable characteristic of the 
                                                                                                             
 152. See id. at 40. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Fisher v. Continental Resources, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 637, 641 (D.N.D. 2014). 
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estate.158 The same public policy considerations for the production of 
energy apply to both estates.159  
In Oklahoma, however, the legislature has preempted judicial 
determination of the wind estate’s dominance.160 It is well settled that the 
surface estate is servient to the mineral estate.161 Specifically, the 
Exploration Rights Act of 2011 provides that 
[T]he lessee of a wind or solar energy agreement or the wind 
energy developer shall not unreasonably interfere with the 
mineral owner's right to make reasonable use of the surface 
estate, including the right of ingress and egress therefor, for the 
purpose of exploring, severing, capturing and producing the 
minerals.162 
Section 803(F) states  
It is the intent of this act to confirm the mineral owner's 
historical right to make reasonable use of the surface estate, 
including the right of ingress and egress therefor, for the purpose 
of exploring, severing, capturing and producing the minerals, 
and nothing in this act is intended to expand or diminish those 
historical rights.163 
Although Oklahoma has foreclosed any attempts to sever the wind estate 
from the surface estate,164 tribes are not prevented from drafting leases, 
whether mineral or wind, to address issues arising from the mineral estate’s 
dominance over the wind/surface estate. Oklahoma’s determination that the 
wind estate remains part of the surface estate can actually aid tribes by 
applying well-established statutes and case law. Tribes can tailor their 
granting clauses to ensure that granted wind production rights take subject 
to the mineral estate’s dominance and foreclose tribal liability for such a 
conflict.  
                                                                                                             
 158. See Nicholas R. House, Conflicting Property Rights Between Conservation 
Easements and Oil and Gas Leases in Ohio: Why Current Law Could Benefit Conservation 
Efforts, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1599 (2014).  
 159. See id.  
 160. See 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 803 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.). 
 161. Dulaney v. Okla. State Dep’t of Health, 868 P.2d 676, 680 (Okla. 1993). 
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b) Contracting to Avoid Surface Use Restrictions 
Tribes often use their lands for many purposes aside from mineral 
development, including farming, ranching, recreation, and housing.165 Wind 
project development and production can interfere with these activities, or 
vice versa, and tribes may attempt to address potential conflicts in their 
wind leases.166 In addition, tribes may simply be concerned with the 
aesthetic effects of wind projects, which include both noise and visual 
impacts.167  
In the case of noise concerns, tribes may include provisions that detail 
specific setbacks of wind turbines from housing or recreation areas. Setback 
provisions permit the tribe to control the level of noise based upon the 
calculable noise at a given location from a wind turbine.168 Visual impacts 
are more difficult to avoid given the size and height of today’s wind 
turbines.169 Additionally, case law precedent does not support a tribe’s 
request to minimize visual impacts under common law theories, which 
highlights the need to address visual impact concerns in leases.170  
2. Duration  
Tribes have several governing authorities that prescribe the allowable 
duration for a wind lease. For example, tribes who have executed a TERA 
are subject to a maximum lease term of thirty years.171 Alternatively, tribes 
may execute leases pursuant to the ILTLA and set an initial term of twenty-
five years with a twenty-five-year renewal term.172 In Oklahoma, the 
Cherokees may execute leases under the ILTLA for up to ninety-nine 
years.173 Absent the application of a TERA lease or ILTLA lease, tribes are 
likely subject to the seven-year maximum term under Section 81.174 
The term of a wind lease is typically twenty to forty-five years;175 
however, some wind leases have a total term of up to 150 years, if renewal 
                                                                                                             
 165. See Hous. Auth. of Kiowa Tribe v. Ware, 10 P.3d 226, 229-30 (Okla. 2000). 
 166. See Ferrell & Rumley, supra note 127, at 41. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See Rankin v. FBL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 512-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). 
 171. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
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options are elected.176 Given the current expected lifespan of a turbine, the 
maximum opportunity for a producer to recoup its investment is twenty 
years.177 As such, the reluctance of tribes to execute TERA agreements and 
the limitation of Section 81 indicates the most viable authority for wind 
lease terms is most likely to come from an ILTLA lease.178 
Tribes should also be cognizant of when the wind lease term begins. 
Because of the ability of a wind lease, like an oil and gas lease, to hold 
rights of production for an extensive period of time, tribes may look to the 
habendum clause of oil and gas leases for guidance as to commencement or 
continuation of the term of the wind lease.179 
Typically, wind energy projects go through a testing or option period, 
which allows a developer to determine whether viable wind flow exists to 
sustain production before the production term of a lease will begin. 180 
Therefore, the habendum clause is not critical to the wind lease according 
to current practice. That being said, industry custom is subject to change. It 
is foreseeable that wind energy producers may wish to secure wind rights 
well ahead of any planned production, especially given the pace of 
technological advancements for wind-powered electricity production. With 
this in mind, tribes may look to the features of oil and gas habendum 
clauses to draft wind lease terms.  
One of the original purposes of the habendum clause was to protect the 
lessor from speculation by lessees.181 Specifically, the habendum clause in 
oil and gas leases describes the term of the lease.182 Although ownership 
theories vary among jurisdictions, the habendum clause functions to allow 
the lessee the right to explore for minerals through a fixed period, primary 
term.183 The lessee may choose to drill, explore, or pay delay rentals in lieu 
of exploration.184 Upon the expiration of the primary term, if there is no 
production or commencement of drilling operations, the lease expires.185 If 
                                                                                                             
 176. Ferrell & Rumley, supra note 127, at 42.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Testimony of Washburn, supra note 74. 
 179. Smith, supra note 119, at 63-64. 
 180. Ferrell & Rumley, supra note 127, at 40. 
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production exists, the lease typically extends for so long as there is 
production.186 
The oil and gas habendum clause necessarily requires interpretation and 
definition of its terms. Courts have interpreted what constitutes production 
sufficient to extend the lease.187 In Oklahoma, oil and gas wells need only 
to be capable of production in paying quantities.188 Oklahoma courts have 
defined the capability of production in paying quantities to mean sufficient 
quantities to yield a return over the lifting costs of production.189 As an 
alternative to production extending the oil and gas lease, a lessee may 
extend the lease by having commenced drilling or exploratory operations.190 
It is these protective features of the oil and gas habendum clause that could 
prove useful to tribal drafting of wind leases.  
The necessary focus of a habendum clause for a tribal wind lease is to 
ensure that production will occur if testing of the site proves that sufficient 
wind resources are available. Typically, a wind lease’s production phase 
begins after construction of roads and erection of the first turbine.191 Thus, a 
tribe’s wind lease habendum clause would be most useful if it required the 
production phase to begin within a reasonable time after testing results have 
been collected and evaluated. Of course, the wind lease should specifically 
define reasonable because of the absence of any interpreting case law on the 
subject. If a wind lease habendum clause is realistic,192 the definition of a 
reasonable time for production must be based on a variety of factors, such 
as availability of construction and production equipment, financing, and 
other contractual necessities. Certainly, if the espoused wind lease 
habendum clause is to be effective, it must be coupled with a testing option 
term that is equally reasonable. In other words, a reasonable time must 
allow sufficient time to diligently test the wind resources.  
Such wind lease habendum clauses are permissible under WEEL and 
WSR agreements. There appears to be no problem with a habendum clause 
that limits the term after testing because the BIA allows a WEEL to contain 
option provisions to allow the creation of a WSR upon expiration of the 
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WEEL.193 Therefore, so long as the habendum clause describes the term 
and defines the events that terminate the lease, the clause will pass 
secretarial review.194 
In Oklahoma, the legislature has statutorily defined necessary terms in 
the wind lease habendum clause. The potentially helpful terms include the 
following: 
 2. “Commencement of construction” means beginning 
excavation of wind turbine foundations or other actions relating 
to the actual erection and installation of commercial wind energy 
equipment. It shall not include erection of meteorological 
towers, environmental assessments, surveys, preliminary 
engineering or other activities associated with assessment of 
development of the wind resources on a given parcel of property. 
 3. “Commercial generation date” means the date on which the 
wind turbine in question first generates electrical energy in 
commercial quantities.195 
These terms may be used in the wind lease habendum clause to mark the 
point at which production begins. Additionally, the definition of 
commercial quantities may be used in a similar manner by ending the term 
of the wind lease when the wind project is no longer commercially viable.  
Although a tribe’s wind lease is subject to similar term restrictions as 
Indian mineral leases, more flexibility exists in designing wind leases. 
Tribes should take advantage of this flexibility and attempt to avoid the 
historic litany of issues associated with oil and gas leases. Oklahoma tribes 
are in a unique position to craft leases using the supporting statutory 
provisions.  
3. Royalty 
There are three distinct types of economic considerations for tribes under 
a wind lease: lease bonus, installation payments, and royalty payments. 196 
Other payments and methods of calculation exist, such as an annual 
payment per turbine.197 Lease bonuses are monies paid upfront to the lessor 
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as consideration for granting the lease.198 The bonus may be based on total 
acreage—as is typical in oil and gas leasing—or on the projected number of 
turbines to be installed.199 Installation payments are designed to compensate 
a lessor for damage to the surface, and they may be made in lieu of a lease 
bonus.200 Royalty payments are based on the revenue produced from wind 
production on the lease.201 Some wind leases provide for a graduated 
schedule for royalty rates as a wind project begins to pay out.202 
The Indian Trust Doctrine likely still requires fair and reasonable 
compensation for wind because of the federal government’s duty to act as a 
fiduciary for Indian tribes.203 But it appears that the BIA will defer to the 
judgment of tribes as to reasonable compensation if the tribe submits an 
authorization expressly stating that: (1) the tribe negotiated satisfactory 
compensation, (2) the tribe waives right to valuation of the wind lease, and 
(3) the tribe states the value of compensation is in its best interest.204 An 
Indian tribe drafting a wind lease will therefore need to ensure the lease 
provisions provide fair and reasonable compensation and that proper 
authorization has been submitted to the BIA. 
Because of the similarities in receiving portions of revenue from 
production, tribal wind leases will likely find oil and gas royalty issues 
instructive.205 One of the most contentious issues surrounding oil and gas 
royalties is the permissible deductions or expenses.206 Often, oil and gas 
lessees charge the lessors royalty interest with certain costs for expenses, 
such as capital, processing, treating, transporting, and marketing 
expenses.207 Courts commonly interpret the royalty language of oil and gas 
leases to govern what type of expenses are properly charged to the lessor’s 
royalty.208 
Thus, tribes should be explicit about royalty rates and any costs that may 
be charged against their royalty interest. In drafting royalty provisions for 
tribal wind leases, the tribe may create definite lists of permissible 
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expenses. While these provisions may be necessary in a later interpretation 
of allowable costs, WEEL and WSR regulations indicate that tribes must 
describe compensation.209 
Other lessons learned from oil and gas royalty disputes are tied to 
implied covenants to market. In the oil and gas industry, implied covenants 
to market impose a duty on the lessee to market production.210 While the 
covenant to market has no direct effect on the calculation of royalty, the 
covenant can determine whether the lessee is ever required to make royalty 
payments.211 And although the covenant to market imposes a duty on the 
lessee, the best efforts of the lessee will often satisfy the covenant.212 No 
such implied covenant to market exists for wind leases.213 Therefore, tribes 
should attempt to include provisions that create the duty of the implied 
covenant to market in wind leases.  
Even so, drafting such a provision may be difficult due to the nature of 
wind production and electrical power. Wind flow is constantly shifting. 
This variability naturally causes fluctuations in electrical production from 
wind,214 which is beyond the control of the producer. Therefore, a provision 
that demands the marketing of production that cannot be readily stored is 
not likely to be feasible. Instead, a marketing provision that requires the 
best efforts of the producer seems appropriate. 
4. Communitization and Pooling  
Wind energy production has special considerations as to the placement 
of turbines and the rights of adjoining surface owners to use or capture their 
own wind resources. The efficiency of a wind turbine to produce electricity 
is a function215 of the wind flow.216 Thus, turbulence caused by nearby 
obstructions, including other wind turbines, may greatly reduce the amount 
of electricity produced by a wind turbine.217  
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 This presents a problematic situation where, in the case of two surface 
owners having adjoining tracts of land suitable for wind production, one 
surface owner may not be able to place a wind turbine on their property 
because of potential turbulence caused by a neighboring turbine. 218 
Alternatively, if each surface owner places a turbine on their property, 
neither may be able to recover the full amount of wind resources that would 
normally be available. It is with this problem in mind that a tribe might look 
to the legal resolution of similar issues in oil and gas in drafting a wind 
lease.   
a) Oil and Gas Communitization and Pooling  
A major concern of state regulation of oil and gas production, in addition 
to public welfare and safety, has been to maximize the total amount of 
recovery of mineral resources from producible formations.219 Stated 
differently, states are concerned with preventing the waste of mineral 
resources and the protection of correlative rights, or the rights of mineral 
estate owners in recovering their due portion of oil and gas. 220 
Communitization and pooling of mineral interests are common features of 
regulation of oil and gas production.221  
To prevent waste, states pool the interests of various owners of mineral 
estates to compensate for the limitations on well spacing and density. 222 
Oklahoma uses drilling and spacing units to control well spacing and 
density and apportion production among the mineral owners. 223 
Additionally, Oklahoma law allows voluntary and compulsory pooling of 
mineral interests.224 Both pooling and drilling and spacing units allocate 
production proceeds among the mineral interest owners, according to the 
ownership of each.225 
The communitization of Indian mineral interests presents a special 
problem that may be instructive to communitizing wind rights. While 
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Indian land may be voluntarily communitized with the approval of the 
Secretary, such lands may not be involuntarily pooled because of federal 
preemption over Indian lands.226 If an Indian tribe or the Secretary does not 
approve the pooling of a tribe’s interests, the tribe’s participation in the 
communitized unit will not occur.227 Ultimately, this can harm the 
economic interests of the tribe because it would prevent them from sharing 
in the electrical production of the communitized area and, in certain 
circumstances, development of wind projects on tribal lands could be 
prevented or discouraged due to turbulence created from the neighboring 
communitized wind project.228 Using the application of communitization to 
tribal oil and gas leases, a tribal wind lease drafter may safeguard against 
communitization issues with wind resources. 
b) Future Communitization of Wind Energy Production  
Research does not address the communitization of wind resource 
production. As illustrated above, oil and gas communitization may provide 
a useful framework for wind communitization development. The key to 
understanding how communitization may function for wind resources is the 
evolution of oil and gas communitization.  
 
(1) Ad Coelum Doctrine  
A foundational canon in the development of communitization of oil and 
gas interests is the ad coelum doctrine. The ad coelum doctrine holds that, 
in addition to the space above, the surface owner owns all of the space 
below the surface.229 While the doctrine played a primary role in 
determination of oil and gas ownership, the doctrine also supported the 
concept of sub-surface trespass.230 Ultimately, it only conferred ownership 
of the airspace actually occupied by the surface owner.231 
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The doctrine is a potential source of authority for the rights associated 
with the wind estate,232 and may also serve as a source for the rights of 
adjacent wind estate owners to be free from interference.233 This right to be 
free from interference of adjacent estate owners may be the precursor to the 
communitization of wind rights. 
(2) Rule of Capture  
The rule of capture is a remedy for mineral owners, and holds that the 
mineral estate owner may capture as much oil and gas as is accessible from 
their mineral estate.234 The rule flows from the fugacious nature of 
underground hydrocarbons—once reduced to the owner’s control, 
ownership of the hydrocarbons lies with that interest holder.235 Adjacent 
mineral estate owners have no legal remedy except to compete in the 
capture of the subsurface hydrocarbons.236  
Because wind resources are ephemeral, wind energy production fits well 
within the rule of capture. Competing landowners, however, are likely to 
eliminate the possibility of full production because of the effects of 
turbulence created by adjacent, competing turbines.237  
(3) Correlative Rights 
A third possible doctrine, one that fits well with the spirit of 
communitization, is the doctrine of correlative rights. The theory of 
correlative rights recognizes the inter-relationship between estate holders’ 
ability to produce their resources and attempts to maximize the overall 
recovery through grouping of interests and sharing of benefits.238 The 
holders of correlative rights must recognize the rights of others and refrain 
from infringing upon those rights, while still pursuing their own interests.239 
A correlative rights approach for wind leasing necessarily contemplates 
the communitization of rights because of the effects that adjacent surface 
owners may have on each other’s production capabilities. The systematic 
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production of wind resources may prove the most efficient and beneficial 
for all parties. But, restrictions upon the severance of the wind estate may 
make production strategies difficult without willing surface owners. This 
presents a special problem for tribes because of the required secretarial 
approval of communitization of property rights.  
c) Contracting Around Future Doctrines 
The doctrines mentioned above highlight just a few paths that wind 
resource law may follow, and emphasize the difficulty of creating a one-
size-fits-all provision for a tribal wind lease. What is clear is that the 
secretarial approval requirement must be satisfied for a tribe to take part in 
a communitization wind project. Therefore, drafters can include provisions 
to assist in including pooled wind resource projects and tribes can develop 
procedures for approving potential communitizations of their leases.  
IV. Conclusion 
Indian tribes have substantially more freedom to contract and develop 
wind leases than their predecessors did in mineral leases. By learning from 
the challenges faced by the tribes in their mineral leasing past, today’s 
tribes can attempt to avoid future issues in developing the emerging frontier 
of wind energy. Reflecting on that past, tribes may use the doctrines and 
features of oil and gas leasing to help craft wind leases that produce the 
resources from the newfound wind estate.  
The tribes of Oklahoma sit in a special position to take advantage of the 
state’s attempts to promote wind energy in the same manner that the state 
promoted oil and gas development. By taking charge of their own wind 
leasing agreements, tribes can fulfill the aspirations of the age of self-
determination in a manner more dynamic than any Congress could have 
envisioned. 
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